Boosting Revenue Collection through Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: The Case of Uganda by Kangave, Jalia et al.
www.ictd.ac
Working Paper 45
Boosting Revenue Collection through 
Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: 
The Case of Uganda
Jalia Kangave, Susan Nakato, Ronald Waiswa and Patrick Lumala Zzimbe 
January 2016
1ICTD Working Paper 45 
Boosting Revenue Collection through 
Taxing High Net Worth Individuals:  
The Case of Uganda
Jalia Kangave, Susan Nakato, Ronald Waiswa and Patrick 
Lumala Zzimbe 
January 2016 
2Boosting Revenue Collection through Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: the Case of Uganda 
Jalia Kangave, Susan Nakato, Ronald Waiswa and Patrick Lumala Zzimbe 
ICTD Working Paper 45 
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in January 2016 
© Institute of Development Studies 2016 
ISBN: 978-1-78118-285-7 
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. 
All rights reserved. Reproduction, copy, transmission, or translation of any part of this publication may 
be made only under the following conditions: 
- with the prior permission of the publisher; or
- with a licence from the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd., 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE, UK,
or from another national licensing agency; or
- under the terms set out below.
This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for teaching or nonprofit purposes, but not for 
resale. Formal permission is required for all such uses, but normally will be granted immediately. For copying in any other 
circumstances, or for reuse in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from 
the publisher and a fee may be payable. 
Available from: 
The International Centre for Tax and Development 
at the Institute of Development Studies 
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK 
Tel: +44 (0) 1273 606261 Fax: +44 (0) 1273 621202 
E-mail: info@ictd.ac.uk  
Web: www.ictd/en/publications 
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338)
3Boosting Revenue Collection through Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: 
the Case of Uganda 
Jalia Kangave, Susan Nakato, Ronald Waiswa and Patrick Lumala Zzimbe 
Summary 
For over a decade Uganda’s tax-to-GDP ratio hovered between 12 per cent and 13 per cent, 
despite various amendments to tax laws and reforms in tax administration. Part of the low 
revenue contribution can be attributed to factors external to the Uganda Revenue Authority 
(URA), such as the structure of the economy – particularly the prevalence of the informal 
sector and the ubiquity of cash transactions. Another explanation is that poor revenue 
collection is a result of factors internal to the URA. One of these factors is that the URA’s 
enforcement efforts have concentrated on taxing corporate entities at the expense of 
individuals. With the exception of employees, very few individuals comply with their tax 
obligations outside those incurred at points of importation. Specifically, many wealthy 
individuals in the private and public sector either do not pay taxes or grossly under-declare 
their income. The consequence is that very little tax is being collected from this category of 
taxpayers.  
This paper explores the potential for increasing tax revenue by taxing High Net Worth 
Individuals (HNWIs) through various lenses, including examining the legislative and 
administrative framework governing the taxation of individuals, collaborative efforts between 
the URA and other government agencies to improve tax administration, and mechanisms in 
place to support the sharing of taxpayer information both within the URA and with third 
parties. We highlight the strengths and weaknesses in the legal and administrative 
frameworks, with the underlying aim of designing an approach for taxing HNWIs. This paper 
discusses the findings of phase one of a two-phase project. The second phase will conduct a 
comparative study on taxation of HNWIs in other jurisdictions, with the aim of developing 
guiding principles for taxing Uganda’s HNWIs.  
Keywords: economic elites; exchange of information; gross domestic product; High Net 
Worth Individuals; tax administration; Uganda Revenue Authority. 
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Introduction 
 
While net tax collection in many developing countries has increased over the years, their tax-
to-GDP ratios remain at less than 20 per cent – compared to the 30 to 45 per cent raised by 
their developed country counterparts (Moore 2013). In Uganda’s case, tax contributions for 
the past decade have hovered between 12 per cent and 13 per cent of GDP, with the figures 
decreasing even further after rebasing (URA databases 2015). The poor tax performance 
can be attributed to a number of factors, including the structure of the economy, the 
existence of a large informal sector, and shortcomings in tax administration. 
 
Graph 1 Uganda’s rebased tax-to-GDP estimates 2009/10-2014/15  
 
 
Source: URA databases 2015 and Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2014. 
 
Uganda’s economic structure 
 
There is often a mismatch in Uganda between the contribution that different sectors make to 
taxation and their contribution to GDP. For example, the agricultural sector, which 
contributes the largest share to the country’s GDP (27.21 per cent), contributes only 0.81 per 
cent to tax revenue (URA databases 2014). Other comparisons include the construction 
industry (8.01 per cent compared to 2.7 per cent), education (5.79 per cent compared to 
1.75 per cent), and real estate (4.21 per cent compared to 1.36 per cent). There are various 
explanations for this mismatch, including the existence of a large informal sector, and the 
provision of tax exemptions to certain sectors such as agriculture and, until recently, 
education.  
 
The existence of a large informal sector 
 
As at June 2015, the informal sector was estimated to constitute 49 per cent of the country’s 
GDP, with agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, construction and the transport sector being 
the most prevalent (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2015). In 
2013, the World Bank reported that the non-agricultural informal sector employed 14 per 
cent of the country’s labour force, of which 86 per cent were household-based jobs (World 
Bank 2013). Graph 2 illustrates the share of the informal sector for the past five years. 
 
  
10.6% 10.3% 10.4%
11.2% 11.7%
12.6%
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Tax to GDP
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Graph 2 Informal sector share (Shs. million) 
 
Source: URA databases.  
 
The above statistics are important for a number of reasons. First, they underscore the fact 
that half of the country’s productivity is non-institutionalised and hence difficult to tax. 
Second, that agriculture (whether commercial or subsistence) is a huge part of the problem. 
What these statistics do not show is the extent to which large commercial enterprises are 
informal. We conceptualise this in Section 2.  
 
The government has undertaken various tax initiatives aimed at curbing the prevalence of 
the informal sector. For example, in 2014, the Income Tax Act (ITA) was amended to raise 
the presumptive tax rate from 1 per cent to 3 per cent of gross turnover (Income Tax Act, 
Second Schedule; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2014). In the 
same year, the Taxpayer Registration Expansion Project (TREP) was introduced as a 
collaboration between the URA, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) and the Uganda 
Registration Services Bureau (URSB). We discuss the details of this project in Section 4. 
More recently, the government introduced withholding taxes on various sectors, particularly 
those operating in the transport sector (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development 2015).  
 
Shortcomings in tax administration 
 
In Sections 3 and 4, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses in the URA’s operations. 
Suffice it to note here that a number of reforms have been made to tax administration, 
including the restructuring of the URA in 2004 to reflect functional ideals, automating some 
internal and external services, developing human capacity (including increasingly recruiting 
from the private sector), and re-engineering business processes.  
 
Despite the introduction of these efficiency measures, revenue collection remains low. We 
argue that this is partly explained by the fact that, like in many other developing countries, 
personal income taxes remain largely untapped (Moore 2013; Mahon Jr. et al. 2015). In 
financial year (FY) 2013/2014, for example, only 4 per cent of the total tax collection was 
attributed to individuals (URA databases 2014). In the same period, individuals remitted less 
than 1 per cent of total domestic tax revenue, compared to the 8 per cent that they 
contributed to international trade taxes. The higher contribution to international trade taxes is 
largely explained by the stringent collection measures at border points. We believe that the 
extremely low level of individual contributions to domestic taxes is partly explained by an 
emphasis being placed on the taxation of companies, at the expense of taxing individuals. 
Part of the solution to this problem thus lies in managing the compliance of individuals 
generally, and wealthy individuals in particular.  
 
The taxation of HNWIs has recently gained traction in many countries for various reasons 
(OECD 2009). First, these individuals often engage in complex commercial transactions. 
Second, they contribute (or have the potential to contribute) significantly to total tax revenue. 
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Third, given their vast amounts of income and wealth, they are more likely to engage in 
aggressive tax planning schemes. Lastly, the compliance behaviour of this group of 
taxpayers is bound to have a bearing on the integrity of the tax system as a whole. Also, 
despite the 2008 global economic crisis, the population of HNWIs has continued to grow. It is 
estimated that, on average, the growth of HNWIs and their wealth globally is at 15 per cent 
and 14 per cent respectively (Capgemini and RBC Wealth Management 2014). In the United 
States, for example, the share of annual income earned by the top 1 per cent between 1976 
and 2011 more than doubled from 9 per cent to 20 per cent (Alvaredo et. al. 2013). 
Comparable increases in top income shares have been recorded in other Western English-
speaking countries, and countries such as China and India (Atkinson et al. 2011). Similarly, 
conservative estimates suggest that, between the 1970s and 2010, private elites in 139 low- 
and middle-income countries accumulated between US$7.3 trillion and US$9.3 trillion in 
unrecorded offshore wealth (Henry 2012). While there is increasing concern surrounding the 
fact there have been significant tax cuts on the income of HNWIs in some high-income 
countries particularly after the 1980s (Piketty et al. 2014; National Economic Council 2012), 
there is at least some evidence that taxing these individuals can lead to significant boosts in 
revenue (OECD 2009). As at 2009, the top 0.5 per cent of taxpayers in the United Kingdom 
paid 17 per cent of total income tax. In Germany, the top 0.1 per cent paid 8 per cent, and in 
the United States, the top 1 per cent paid about 40 per cent of federal income taxes. Our 
hypothesis is that identifying and taxing Uganda’s HNWIs will result in an increase in the 
contribution that individuals make to tax revenue specifically, and in the tax contribution to 
GDP more generally. 
 
We investigate the potential promised by the taxation of HNWIs through various lenses. In 
Section 1, we conceptualise wealth in Uganda with the aim of understanding the nature of 
the economy and how wealth is amassed. Section 2 analyses the legal framework governing 
the taxation of individuals and regulation of huge cash transactions. Section 3 examines the 
extent to which tax administration has mirrored legal provisions. In Section 4, we appraise 
the various avenues for the sharing and management of taxpayer information. Section 5 
proposes some preliminary recommendations on how to approach the taxation of HNWIs. 
The paper concludes in Section 6.  
 
Our discussion is intended to serve various purposes. To begin with, it is aimed at 
acquainting the reader with the policy and legislative framework governing the taxation of 
individuals in Uganda. Second, it underscores some of the successes that have been 
achieved through the URA’s attempts to improve tax administration, and flags areas where 
there is room for improvement. Third, we disseminate some statistics and narratives about 
tax administration which have hitherto largely been internal to the URA. We hope that this 
dissemination not only contributes to the body of literature on tax administration, but, 
perhaps more importantly, provides the groundwork for future conversations between tax 
administrators, taxpayers and other stakeholders, including those in the private sector, 
academia, other revenue authorities, non-governmental organisations and development 
partners.  
 
We employed various methods in our research. We analysed a variety of texts, including 
academic articles, domestic laws, international agreements, parliamentary Hansards, reports 
and articles by international organisations, URA reports, newspaper articles and lifestyle 
magazines. Second, we conducted interviews with individuals in government agencies, 
including commissioners, managers and revenue officials in the URA, and officials from 
KCCA, Ministry of Finance, Financial Intelligence Authority and the Bank of Uganda. We 
also held interviews with representatives from the private sector, including tax consultants 
from two of the leading audit firms, a reputable tax lawyer, officials from a commercial bank, 
and a professor from the Makerere University School of Law. Lastly, using internal URA 
databases and some external data, we conducted various data matching exercises geared 
largely towards establishing the level of tax compliance. Internal data consisted of 
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information on taxpayer registration, payments data, income tax returns data, audit data, 
stamp duty payments and motor vehicle data. Externally, we matched information from the 
KCCA’s property register with that of the URA’s rental register, to establish the 
comprehensiveness of the latter.  
 
 
1  Defining HNWIs for Uganda’s purposes: 
understanding the economic and socio-cultural 
terrain 
 
HNWIs, also known as economic elites, high wealth or high income individuals, are defined 
differently in different contexts (DiCaprio 2014). The OECD observes that, while there is no 
universally accepted definition of HNWIs, various wealth reports associate these individuals 
with a net worth of at least US$1 million held either directly or indirectly through controlled 
entities such as private companies and trusts (OECD 2009). In Australia, they are defined as 
individuals who, together with their associates, effectively control A$30 million or more in net 
wealth (Australian Taxation Office 2008). Australia’s HNWIs have been found to engage 
frequently in complex business arrangements, with their wealth being spread across groups 
of closely-held companies and trusts. For its part, the South African Revenue Service 
defines HNWIs as individuals with a gross income of at least R7 million and/or gross wealth 
of at least R75 million (South African Revenue Service 2012). A significant number of these 
individuals are believed to conceal their income in trusts (South African Revenue Service 
2014).  
 
While the URA introduced a HNWI category in July 2012 as part of the taxpayers handled by 
the Large Taxpayers’ Office (LTO), it does not have a register of these individuals. Similarly, 
apart from designating HNWIs as large taxpayers, there is no definition or criterion that 
guides the determination of what makes one qualify to be a HNWI. As at January 2015, the 
LTO register had a total of 737 taxpayers, seventeen of whom were individuals (URA 
databases 2015). On 1 July 2015, in a move to provide more clarity on the definition of 
HNWIs, internal taxpayer segmentation was revised to add that these individuals will be 
identified by their net worth. The URA is yet to determine a threshold for this net worth. 
Some guidance can be drawn from the new LTO criteria, which defines large taxpayers as 
including the top fifty individuals based on tax contribution, and all taxpayers whose average 
annual tax contribution exceeds Shs.4 billion (approximately US$1.44 million).1  
 
In the following discussion we focus on identifying the indicators of wealth in Uganda, and 
highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the legislative and administrative frameworks 
governing taxation and relevant economic activities. We do not, for the purposes of this 
discussion, propose a threshold for HNWIs. This task is being kept for the second phase of 
the project for which this research is undertaken. As such, we refer to these individuals 
variously as wealthy individuals, potential HNWIs, economic elites and affluent individuals. 
We are aware that the lack of a working threshold may be perceived as a weakness in our 
research methodology. However, we find it more pertinent at this stage to focus on the 
substance of the principles that should guide taxation of these individuals, because these 
principles will subsequently have a bearing on determination of the threshold.  
 
Any definition of HNWIs ought to be informed by an understanding not only of a country’s 
economic structure, but also an appreciation of the manner in which wealth is amassed, 
                                                          
1  We use URA average exchange rates for FY 2014/15. At the time of writing, this rate was US$1 = Shs.2,786.97. 
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preserved and safeguarded in that country. To this end, it is important to understand 
Uganda’s social-cultural setting, because this has at least some bearing on defining symbols 
of wealth. Our aim in this part of the paper is to develop a conceptual and theoretical base 
that is helpful in contextualising wealth on the one hand, and providing the groundwork for 
developing a comprehensive framework for taxing HNWIs on the other hand.  
 
Uganda is largely a ‘real property’ economy. By this, we mean that, instead of depositing 
money in bank accounts or investing in instruments such as shares and bonds, most 
individuals invest in physical structures, such as land and buildings. A 2013 survey of 4,032 
households in rural and urban Uganda found that only 20 per cent of the adult population 
operated a bank account (Economic Policy Research Centre 2013). While 68 per cent of the 
population saved money, only 19 per cent of those were saving their money in formal banks. 
As far as Uganda’s wealthy individuals are concerned, the richer they become, the more 
commercial structures they put up (Murangira 2014). Interviews with those working on the 
URA’s Rental Project, for example, revealed that while many wealthy individuals are traders 
who deal in the import and export of goods, most of the proceeds from their businesses 
appear to be invested in real estate (Interviews with URA officials). Similarly, even 
professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, architects and engineers (whose primary source of 
income is from the provision of professional services), often subsequently invest their 
earnings in land and commercial buildings. This is not to suggest that there are no other 
important indicators of wealth in Uganda. There are, for example, wealthy individuals dealing 
in manufacturing, construction and commercial agriculture (Interview with Professor at 
Makerere University). There are also individuals whose wealth is attributed to their 
directorships and shareholdings in some of the top taxpaying companies (Interview with Tax 
Consultants; Interview with URA official). URA records as at January 2015 indicate, for 
example, that sixteen individuals hold directorships in more than five of the top taxpaying 
companies (URA databases 2015). These individuals are potential HNWIs. In the end, 
however, many of them reinvest their earnings in land and commercial properties. Even 
inheritance, which was identified as an important source of wealth for some affluent 
members of society, often comes in the form of land and buildings (Interview with Professor 
at Makerere University).  
 
There is a slight difference between the symbols of wealth in rural and urban Uganda. In 
urban areas, such as Kampala, wealthy individuals invest mostly in commercial properties. 
In many rural areas, the symbols of wealth include large chunks of (agricultural) land and 
livestock. In Ankole, for example, cattle serve as a ‘living bank’, in the sense that they are 
held not only to meet household consumption needs, but also to be sold when families need 
to meet larger expenses such as school fees and medical bills (Wurzinger et al. 2008). 
However, even for those whose wealth is defined by livestock, land invariably constitutes a 
central component of this wealth, because the more livestock (particularly cattle) one has, 
the more grazing land is required. Consequently, while our research identified various 
categories of wealth and income sources for potential HNWIs, and while it is important for 
the URA to investigate these sources, the primacy of land and buildings as a source of 
amassing and preserving wealth cannot be overemphasised. To this end, any attempt to 
identify and define HNWIs for Uganda’s purposes has to rely significantly on the 
development of a comprehensive and up-to-date register of land and commercial properties.  
 
Second, as noted in the Introduction, Uganda has a huge informal sector, and many 
individuals thrive in this informality. There is often a tendency to equate the informal sector 
with micro-enterprises and unskilled labour. While it is true that a significant proportion of 
those operating informally are small businesses, it is also true that, increasingly, there is a 
small proportion of very wealthy individuals who have thrived precisely because they have 
remained informal. Their businesses have various characteristics: they transact mainly in 
cash, do not keep proper books of account, are not registered with government agencies, 
many do not deposit their money in bank accounts, and they have less than five employees 
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(Interviews with URA officials; Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2009). Frequently, the business 
owners have little formal education, but make thousands of millions of Ugandan shillings on 
a daily basis; for most, the only taxes that they pay are those paid on importation (Interview 
with Tax Consultants). Having said that, the informal sector in Uganda is not necessarily 
synonymous with unskilled labour. There is also a large informal sector within the formal 
sector. By this we mean that there are many professionals – both in the private and public 
sector – who may pay taxes on their employment income and/or importation of goods, but 
take advantage of the loopholes created by the informal sector to undertake additional 
lucrative commercial enterprises on which they do not pay taxes. This informal income – 
which sometimes is much more than their formal income – is derived from activities such as 
letting out commercial properties, operating fleets of commercial vehicles, running hardware 
stores, and, increasingly, engaging in commercial agriculture (Interviews with URA officials).   
 
HNWIs often possess political capital. Fairfield observes that economic elites have two kinds 
of power: instrumental power and structural power (Fairfield 2010, 2013). Instrumental power 
relates to the ability of these individuals to use political action (such as lobbying) to influence 
government policies. This power emanates from concerted efforts between business 
persons and government officials, the recruitment of business elites into important 
government positions, and the establishment of partisan linkages between business people 
and political parties. Structural power, on the other hand, is less direct. It does not rely on 
any action being undertaken by the business community. Rather, it is driven by a threat that 
policy reforms will result in decreased investment or lead to capital flight.  
 
For the purposes of Fairfield’s discussion, economic elites are distinct from political elites. 
The former use their structural and instrumental power to influence the actions of the latter. 
In Uganda’s case, there is an additional layer of complexity. There are those economic elites 
who could loosely be referred to as ‘pure economic elites’ – pure in the sense that they are 
business persons and professionals whose economic resources give them access to 
policymakers and government executives, hence facilitating tax bargains (Kangave and 
Katusiimeh 2015). These individuals possess both structural and instrumental power, but 
they are neither politicians nor civil servants. The second category is a less traditional one, 
but perhaps results in the most significant fiscal footprint. It consists of civil servants and 
politicians as potential HNWIs. While the official salaries of these individuals are often quite 
modest, some of them amass significant amounts of wealth through unexplained sources, 
and yet do not pay taxes on this wealth, even after it has been invested (Interviews with URA 
officials). Corruption scandals, for example, reveal huge sums of money that are embezzled 
by public servants, including: US$12.7 million of donor funding that was given to the Office of 
the Prime Minister in 2012; US$4.5 million of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria in 2005; US$800,000 from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations 
in 2006; US$2.4 million for the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Human 
Rights Watch 2013). Similarly, an analysis of the URA taxpayer databases reveals a number 
of government officials associated with various commercial enterprises, such as schools, 
hotels, media houses, and land worth billions of shillings (URA databases 2011-2014) 
However, the majority of these individuals do not pay income taxes. Also, most of the 
companies they are associated with do not comply with their tax obligations.  
 
Table 1 Compliance of government officials and companies they are associated with 
 FY 2011/12 FY 2012/13 FY 2013/14 
Total number of officials 71 71 71 
Paid individuals’ taxes 0 0 1 
Number of companies  56 56 56 
Paid corporation tax 9 9 17 
Did not pay corporation tax  47 47 39 
 Source: URA databases. 
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Lastly, it has been suggested that HNWIs are more likely than other taxpayers to engage in 
aggressive tax planning, given the vast amount of their wealth (OECD 2009). In addition, 
these individuals are quite likely to recruit the services of financial experts, who assist in 
designing the aggressive tax planning strategies. In Uganda’s case, there is little likelihood 
of this happening. There are a few cases of individuals who may attempt to split their income 
so that they are taxed at lower tax rates, either by arranging that part of their income is paid 
outside Uganda or by splitting wealth between family members, particularly spouses and 
children (Interview with Tax Consultants). Also, the tax burden of highly salaried individuals 
may be reduced by paying their income in the form of management fees offshore: this would 
attract an effective tax rate of 15 per cent, compared to an effective 40 per cent rate if it is 
paid as employment income. On the whole, however, almost all those who were interviewed 
attested to the fact that, at least as far as individuals are concerned, Uganda’s taxpayers 
rarely engage in aggressive tax planning. Rather, they are more correctly defined as 
engaging in aggressive tax evasion. This means that most of them simply do not pay taxes 
or grossly under-declare their income. Even the big four audit firms in Uganda,2 which are in 
a position to provide advice on tax planning, rarely have individuals as their clients (Interview 
with official from Ministry of Finance). Consequently, the solution for the URA as far as this 
group of taxpayers is concerned, should not so much be geared towards strengthening 
technical capacity to identify aggressive tax planning schemes. Rather, it should be about 
strengthening technical capacity to undertake audits where there is scant information, and 
developing mechanisms for detecting cases of evasion.  
 
 
2  Legislative framework governing economic 
affairs of individuals 
 
There are two main laws having a bearing on the affairs of affluent individuals in Uganda: the 
Income Tax Act and the Anti-Money Laundering Act.  
 
2.1 The Income Tax Act 
 
There is no specific law governing the taxation of HNWIs in Uganda. However, there are 
various provisions in the Income Tax Act (ITA) that have a bearing on the commercial 
activities of individuals. These provisions can loosely be divided into charging provisions, 
general anti-avoidance rules, provisions relating to the taxation of non-residents, and those 
dealing with offences, penalties and the obligation to pay taxes.  
 
2.1.1 Charging provisions 
 
The ITA imposes a tax on every individual earning rental income (Section 5), employment 
income (Section 19), business income (Section 18), and property income (Section 20). 
Uganda uses a residence-based system of taxation where residents are taxed on all their 
worldwide income, while non-residents are taxed on income sourced in Uganda. Section 9 of 
the ITA defines a resident individual for tax purposes. There are four tax bands for resident 
individuals, and three bands for non-residents. 
 
  
                                                          
2  PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young and Deloitte.  
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The income tax rates applicable to the annual income of resident individuals are: 
 
Chargeable income Rate of tax 
Not exceeding Shs.2,820,000 0% 
Exceeding Shs.2,820,000 but not exceeding Shs.4,020,000 10% of the income exceeding Shs.2,820,000 
Exceeding Shs.4,020,000 but not exceeding Shs.4,920,000 Shs.120,000 plus 20% of the income exceeding 
Shs.4,020,000 
Over Shs.4,920,000 a. Shs.300,000 plus 30% of the income exceeding 
Shs.4,920,000; 
b. Where the chargeable income exceeds Shs.120,000,000, 
an additional 10% is charged on the amount by which the 
chargeable income exceeds Shs.120,000,000 
 
The income tax rates applicable to the annual income of non-resident individuals are: 
 
Chargeable income Rate of tax 
Not exceeding Shs.4,020,000 10%  
Exceeding Shs.4,020,000 but not exceeding Shs.4,920,000 Shs.402,000 plus 20% of the income exceeding 
Shs.4,020,000 
Over Shs.4,920,000 a. Shs.582,000 plus 30% of the income exceeding 
Shs.4,920,000; 
b. Where the chargeable income exceeds Shs.120,000,000, 
an additional 10% is charged on the amount by which the 
chargeable income exceeds Shs.120,000,000 
 
2.1.2 Anti-avoidance rules 
 
The ITA contains provisions aimed at deterring taxpayers from engaging in aggressive tax 
planning. Section 64, for example, provides that the URA can adjust the chargeable income 
of an individual where the individual attempts to split income with an associate either through 
transferring property directly or indirectly to the associate with the aim of lowering the tax 
payable by the transferor or the transferee. An associate is defined in Section 3 as a person 
who, ‘not being an employee, acts in accordance with the directions, requests, suggestions, 
or wishes of another person, whether or not they are in a business relationship and whether 
those directions, requests, suggestions, or wishes are communicated to the first-mentioned 
person’. This provision is particularly useful because many affluent individuals in Uganda 
hold their properties in the names of their children and/or spouses (Interview with URA 
officials and officials from the Banking Sector). Similarly, Section 90 of the ITA gives the 
URA power to distribute, allocate and apportion income, deductions or credits between 
associated parties in order to reflect the arms-length principle. Lastly, under Section 91, the 
URA can re-characterise a transaction or an element of a transaction that was entered into 
as part of a tax avoidance scheme.  
 
2.1.3 Taxation of non-residents 
 
HNWIs do not have to be resident in Uganda. Any income sourced in Uganda by non-
residents is subject to tax. Some of the provisions on the taxation of non-residents that may 
have a bearing on commercial activities of HNWIs are those relating to contractors and 
professionals under Uganda-sourced service contracts (Section 85), or other international 
payments such as dividends, interest, royalties and rents paid to non-residents (Section 83). 
It is also important to study the list provided in Section 79, which outlines instances when 
income belonging to a non-resident is deemed to be sourced in Uganda.  
 
2.1.4 Tax obligations, penalties and offences 
 
Extant literature on the taxation of economic elites specifically and effective tax systems 
generally acknowledges that a good tax system should rely on quasi-voluntary compliance 
(Everest-Phillips 2009; Moore 2013). ‘It is voluntary because taxpayers choose to pay. It is 
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quasi-voluntary because coercion will be used against non-compliers if they are caught’ 
(Therkildsen 2001). For this reason, even those tax administrations that have relatively high 
compliance rates maintain penalty regimes to serve as a deterrent to non-compliance 
(OECD 2009). Uganda has a self-assessment system of taxation (Section 96), where 
taxpayers are required to file returns for each year of income. The URA is allowed to audit 
returns within five years of the return being filed (Section 95). Where the taxpayer fails to 
furnish a return or the URA is not satisfied with a return that has been filed, the latter may 
use their best judgement to make an assessment of the chargeable income of the tax payer 
and the tax payable thereon (Section 95). Tax, when it becomes due, is a debt to the 
government, which can be sued for or recovered in a court of competent jurisdiction (Section 
104). The law also allows the URA to recover taxes from a third party owing money to the 
taxpayer, or someone holding money on behalf of the taxpayer (Section 106). Lastly, the 
URA can undertake distress proceedings against the taxpayer’s property (Section 107).  
 
It is an offence for a taxpayer to fail to furnish a tax return (Section 137), to fail to keep 
proper records (Section 139), and to make false or misleading statements (Section 142). 
These offences are punishable by fines and/or imprisonment. Similarly, where taxes remain 
unpaid, interest is charged on the unpaid tax (Section 136).  
 
2.2 The Anti-Money Laundering Act 
 
Existing studies note that, while most of the income of HNWIs is held onshore, there is still a 
significant amount held in offshore accounts (OECD 2009). Worse still, those HNWIs 
engaging in aggressive tax planning schemes also often engage in offshore tax evasion 
(OECD 2009). As at 2010, one study estimated that at least US$21 trillion to US$32 trillion in 
private wealth escaped tax by being invested in offshore secrecy jurisdictions (Henry 2012). 
It is also estimated that between the 1970s and 2008, cumulative capital flight from Africa 
amounted to US$854 billion (Global Financial Integrity 2010). In Uganda’s case, 
conservative estimates put illicit financial flows at 3 per cent of GDP (High Level Panel 
2015). While the illicit financial flows in Africa have been mostly attributed to the activities of 
large corporations and organised crime (High Level Panel 2015), there is evidence of a 
rapidly growing number of HNWIs in Africa whose wealth is often invested abroad (Knight 
Frank 2014; Capgemini and RBC Wealth Management 2013). Those interviewed for this 
project agreed that, while Uganda’s wealthy individuals keep most of their money in the 
country, there is some known and a lot more unknown wealth that is likely invested abroad – 
particularly in bank accounts (Interviews with URA officials and tax consultants). The early 
2015 leaking of bank account files of an HSBC Swiss subsidiary, which revealed that there 
were 57 HSBC clients associated with Uganda who held a total of $89.3 million in bank 
deposits, is just one example of offshore investments (Sserunjogi 2015). Similarly, 2011 
parliamentary proceedings contain allegations of three government officials being bribed by 
companies in the oil sector (Parliament of Uganda 2011a). There were allegations that oil 
companies wired millions of euros to offshore accounts in the United Arab Emirates and 
United Kingdom using various conduits, including shell companies and bank accounts in 
other jurisdictions.  
 
The primary legislation governing large cash transactions and illicit financial flows is the Anti-
Money Laundering Act. Section 6 of the Act requires that bank accounts should be kept in 
the names of the account holders, instead of anonymous accounts or accounts held in 
fictitious or incorrect names. In the case of politically-exposed persons, banks are required to 
monitor the transactions of these individuals, take reasonable steps to establish the source 
of their wealth or income, and monitor their business relations with these individuals (Section 
6). These provisions are quite relevant given our observation that some of Uganda’s 
potential HNWIs are political figures. 
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Section 6 (h) provides that, in cases of cross-border correspondent banking, banks should 
undertake due diligence measures, including gathering information about the respondent 
institution’s reputation, access their anti-money-laundering financial controls, be satisfied 
that their due diligence measures in relation to customers are sufficient, reject correspondent 
relationships with shell banks, and obtain approval from senior management prior to entering 
into correspondent relationship. Under Section 6 (k), banks are required to develop 
programmes that support the detection of money laundering, including policies and 
procedures for screening employees, conduct on-going employee training, and establish 
audit functions that test the effectiveness of the systems. There is also a requirement under 
Section 7 for banks to retain identity records of clients for at least ten years, and maintain the 
customer’s identity and other business transactions for at least five years after closure of 
business. 
 
The Anti-Money Laundering Act requires that cash or monetary transactions exceeding 
Shs.20 million (US$7,176) should be recorded on a prescribed form, which banks should 
maintain for a period of ten years from the date of the transaction (Section 8). In the case of 
currency or monetary instruments in excess of Shs.30 million (US$10,764) that cross 
borders without going through the normal banking procedures or Uganda’s financial banking 
systems, there is a requirement for the person intending to make the transfer to inform the 
URA before making the transfer (Section 9). The URA is then immediately required to 
forward a copy of the form to the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA).  
 
The establishment of the FIA is provided for under Section 18 of the Act. The FIA is tasked 
with combatting money laundering, including enhancing public awareness on the issue, 
making collected information available to competent authorities, and exchanging information 
with other countries that have treaties with Uganda (Section 19). It has powers to receive 
information relating to money laundering, collect information that it considers relevant, and to 
retain it for a period that it deems fit (Section 37).  
 
The law tasks banks with taking note of suspicious (complex, unusual or large) transactions, 
transactions undertaken on behalf of persons whose identity has not been properly 
established, business relationships in countries that have no proper anti-money laundering 
controls, and electronic fund transfers that do not have proper originator information (Section 
9). Where banks suspect that transactions are being undertaken for the purpose of evading 
taxes, they should seek further information on the identity of the transacting parties, the 
purpose of the transaction, the origin and destination of the money, and its ultimate 
beneficiary. These suspicious transactions should be reported to the FIA not later than two 
working days from the day of the suspicious transaction.  
 
There are various offences contained in the Act, including engaging in, aiding or abetting 
money laundering activities (Section 116); tipping off a person that information regarding 
them has been requested, furnished or reported to the FIA (Section 117); falsifying, 
concealing or destroying documents relevant to a money laundering investigation (118); 
failing to keep records in the manner prescribed by the Act (Section 120); facilitating money 
laundering (section 121); destroying or tampering with records (Section 122); refusing to give 
assistance to the FIA (Section 123); failing to report required cash transactions (section 
124); failing to report suspicious or unusual transactions (Section 125); failing to report 
cross-border cash transfers (Section 126); and not making reports to the FIA (Section 127). 
Penalties under the Act include imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years, or fines not 
exceeding Shs.2 billion (approximately US$0.72 million) (Section 136).  
 
The combination of the ITA and the Anti-Money Laundering Act provide for a robust legal 
framework for dealing with the economic affairs of HNWIs generally and their taxation in 
particular. However, it is one thing to have a strong legal framework, and quite another to 
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ensure that provisions of the law are translated into practice. The next section discusses the 
practical application of these laws.  
 
 
3  Translating policy into practice: 
administrative strengths and weaknesses 
 
in poor country settings, … actual tax policy is strongly influenced by the operations 
of the tax administration  
Therkildsen 2001 
 
tax administration is tax policy  
de Jantcher 1990 
 
3.1 Status of the URA 
 
The URA was established in 1991 as a semi-autonomous revenue agency in charge of 
administering tax laws, including assessing, collecting and accounting for revenue (Uganda 
Revenue Authority Act, Cap 196). In addition, the body was tasked with advising the Minister 
of Finance on revenue implications, tax administration and policy issues relating to revenue. 
The semi-autonomous status it enjoys means that the URA is independent of civil service 
rules and regulations. This has allowed it flexibility relating to aspects such as its 
organisational structure, staffing, salaries and incentives, procurement and budgeting.  
 
At the same time, because it is not fully independent, the URA remains under the general 
supervision of the Ministry of Finance. Under the URA Act, for example, the Minister of 
Finance has powers to:  
 
 Appoint the chairperson and three other members of the URA’s Board of Directors. 
Similarly, the minister has the power to suspend or terminate appointments of board 
members; 
 Provide guidance on how the Board should perform its functions; 
 Appoint and terminate the appointment of the URA’s Commissioner General (in 
consultation with the Board); and 
 Authorise the percentage of collected revenue to be retained by the URA to meet its 
expenditure budget. 
 
Lastly, the minister sets performance targets for the URA every year in the form of amounts 
to be collected in tax revenue (Kangave 2005).  
 
The URA’s status is important to the taxation of HNWIs for various reasons. On the one 
hand, its semi-autonomous nature means that it has independence in its tax administrative 
duties, unlike previously where revenue administration was integrated in the functions of the 
Ministry of Finance. This independence is particularly important because of the politics that 
we have identified surrounding the taxation of HNWIs. On the other hand, semi-autonomy 
implies only partial autonomy, meaning that the likelihood of political interference remains 
high. That the Commissioner General – the head of the URA – and a significant proportion of 
board members are appointed by and can be dismissed by the Minister of Finance provides 
room for political interference into the affairs of the URA, and could have a bearing on any 
strategies aimed at taxing politically-connected persons such as HNWIs. 
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3.2 Strengths in tax administration  
 
A strong legislative framework does not guarantee an effective tax system. The URA has 
undertaken various reforms in tax administration in a bid to translate the law into practice. 
Some of these reforms are highlighted in the introduction. We highlight additional reforms 
below. These initiatives are important insofar as they provide infrastructure that is useful to 
support the taxation of HNWIs.  
 
3.2.1 The Taxpayer Register Expansion Project (TREP) 
 
In 2013, the Minister of Finance proposed that the URA, local governments, KCCA and 
URSB should collaborate in the identification of taxpayers and collection of taxes (Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2013). This move was intended to widen the 
tax base, particularly by registering small businesses. In January 2014, the URA, KCCA and 
URSB commenced an operation – TREP – to streamline business registration (Uganda 
Revenue Authority undated; Ssempebwa 2014). Under TREP, the parties use a single 
registration form (based on KCCA’s ECITIE system) to capture business information, which 
is shared between the parties on a weekly basis (TREP Report 2015). 
  
The URA hopes to use TREP to expand its taxpayer register by adding an additional 
103,570 taxpayers, who will contribute an additional Shs.12.9 billion (approximately US$4.63 
million) to tax revenue (Uganda Revenue Authority, undated; Ssempebwa, 2014). Initial 
success was registered through the ‘Operation Storm Kampala’ exercise; this enabled the 
URA to use information provided by KCCA to storm prominent shopping malls and register a 
number of businesses that were not on the URA’s tax register. As at June 2015, TREP had 
added a total of 47,647 taxpayers onto the URA tax register (TREP Report 2015). While the 
main objective of TREP is to reduce the informal sector, particularly by identifying and taxing 
small businesses, this exercise is likely to result in the identification of businesses that may 
be small in terms of physical size, but have huge gross turnovers. Some of the individuals 
running these businesses would fit our definition of HNWIs who have thrived because of the 
informality.  
 
3.2.2 The Rental Project 
 
Since its enactment in 1997, the ITA provided for taxation of rental income. However, this 
provision of the law was rarely implemented. In 2014, Section 2 of the ITA was amended to 
define rental income as income derived by persons (as opposed to individuals). Prior to this, 
rental tax was imposed only on individuals; other legal persons had their income from letting 
out of properties categorised as business income. The URA suggested the amendment to 
the Ministry of Finance, following the realisation that a number of individuals were concealing 
their income through companies because the latter enjoyed a more favourable tax regime 
(Interview with Ministry of Finance official). It was thus hoped that a single regime would plug 
any existing loopholes.  
 
In July 2014, the URA announced that it would begin collecting taxes on all rental houses 
and properties located in urban areas (Mulondo 2014). In the same month, the URA’s Rental 
Project was started to concentrate on generating a property register and increasing revenue 
collections from this tax head. As at 2 January 2015, the property register had 9,606 
properties (URA databases 2015). Given the intimate relationship between Uganda’s 
wealthy individuals and real property, a robust register of commercial properties will be 
central to increasing revenue collection from this group of taxpayers.   
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3.2.3 The electronic tax system 
 
The electronic tax system (e-tax) was introduced by the URA in 2009, with the objective of 
easing and improving tax compliance through online registration, filing of tax returns and 
payment of taxes (Tata Consultancy Services 2011). This system was also intended to 
facilitate information sharing between URA departments by providing a ‘single and integrated 
view of the taxpayer’. Sharing of information within the URA is made possible through built 
reports that are geared towards facilitating automatic matching of taxpayer information 
possessed by the URA’s different departments (Interview with URA Official). Through these 
reports, authorised personnel are able to observe automatic links of transactions undertaken 
by registered taxpayers. For example, it is possible to automatically match data on a VAT 
declaration for inputs with information on the supplier of the inputs, and to establish whether 
the latter has met their tax filing obligations and is declaring the correct amount of output 
VAT. It is also possible to automatically match information on amounts claimed for input VAT 
with expenditure claimed under corporation tax or individual income taxes. Until recently, 
automatic matches could be made between direct taxes and customs duties under the 
Automated System for Customs Data++ (ASYCUDDA++). However, with the switch to 
ASYCUDDA World, the e-tax team is still working on the automatic interface between the 
new customs system and domestic taxes. At the time of writing, the domestic tax department 
was receiving data from ASYCUDDA World through dynamic reports that were manually 
generated.  
 
The developments in the e-tax system are of great relevance to improving tax administration 
generally and increasing revenue from HNWIs. For example, in FY 2012/2013 the URA had 
2.3 million visits to its web portal, up from 1.3 million in the previous year (Banage 2013). 
During the same period, the e-tax system recorded 4,417,245 transactions and collected 
Shs.6 trillion (approximately US$2.15 billion), which accounted for 75 per cent of collected 
revenue.  
 
3.2.4 The VIP taxpayer segment 
 
Effective 1 July 2015, the URA introduced a segment of taxpayers known as the VIP Group, 
consisting of two categories of individuals. The first category is powerful government 
officials, including the president of Uganda, the vice president, cabinet ministers, certain 
judicial officers, the speaker and deputy speaker of Parliament, kingdom heads, heads of 
political parties, heads of government institutions, the inspector general of police and chief of 
defence forces. The second category is composed of individuals who have the potential to 
influence large masses without necessarily being political or cultural figures. These include 
heads of professional associations, heads of business associations, heads of foreign 
business investors, religious leaders, individuals in offices that impact on URA businesses 
and outspoken individuals (including activists, journalists, religious and political figures). 
These two categories of individuals will be accorded special treatment by the URA, and their 
matters will be treated with a ‘high level of security’.  
 
VIPs as defined by this new segmentation are not necessarily HNWIs. However, as 
demonstrated in Section 1, they are potential HNWIs because of the quintessential link 
between politically-exposed persons and wealth in Uganda. The new segmentation, if 
administered effectively, will also be a useful channel for encouraging conversations 
between the URA and this group of individuals to encourage tax compliance.   
 
3.3 Shortcomings in tax administration 
 
While there have been various reforms to tax administration, there are still a number of 
shortcomings that undermine revenue collection. A few examples suffice.  
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3.3.1 Taxation of individuals 
 
Despite the fact that the ITA provides for the taxation of individuals, and that individuals 
account for 92.5 per cent of the taxpayer register (URA databases 2015), in practice little 
attention is paid to their taxation (Interviews with URA officials; Interview with tax 
consultants). Most of the URA’s enforcement measures concentrate on companies 
(Interviews with URA officials). There are a number of issues that warrant special attention 
as far as taxation of individuals is concerned: 
 
a. 68 per cent of individuals on the taxpayer register are employees. The remaining 32 per 
cent consist of business persons (15 per cent), individuals earning rental income (1 per 
cent), and other income (16 per cent).3 The high percentage attributed to employees is 
testimony to the importance of withholding taxes in facilitating compliance. However, our 
research found that even employment income is still under-reported, and the URA’s 
enforcement measures still fall short in this regard. For example, even though the ITA 
has always defined employment income to include the directorship of a company, it was 
not until 2013 that the URA started enforcing the provisions of the Act to require 
directors either to pay taxes through Pay As You Earn (PAYE) or to file individual 
income tax returns (Interview with URA official). Before 2013, the URA’s focus was on 
companies as legal persons, with limited, if any, attention being paid to the individuals 
managing the companies. And while directors are now required to file returns, there is 
still a strong belief within the URA that these individuals under-declare their income, 
particularly when one takes into account company profits and taxes paid on the same 
(Interview with URA official). For example, the payments data relating to FY 2013/2014 
indicates that only 5 per cent of directors remitted income tax, with some remitting as 
little as Shs.15,000 (approximately US$5.38), despite the fact that their companies were 
among the top taxpayers for that year;4 
 
b. Registration for taxes does not necessarily translate into payment of taxes. With the 
exception of employees, most other individuals who are registered for tax purposes do 
not honour their tax obligations. In FY 2013/2014, for example, only 13 per cent of the 
individuals on the tax register (i.e. those earning rental income, business income and 
other income) remitted some payment to the URA (URA databases 2014).  
 
Table 2 Individual taxpayers’ payment status 2013/2014 (excluding PAYE) 
 Made a payment            26,942  13.0% 
 Did not pay           180,962  87.0% 
 Total registered           207,904  100.0% 
 
Similarly, there is a mismatch between individuals who pay customs duties and those who 
pay income tax. For example, as Table 3 shows, in FY 2013/2014 four individuals paid over 
Shs.1 billion in customs taxes, but only two of these paid income tax (URA Payments Data 
2013/2014). In addition, twelve individuals paid over Shs.500 million (approximately 
US$179,406) in customs duties, but none of these remitted income tax.  
 
  
                                                          
3  ‘Other income’ caters for individuals who are on the register for purposes such as vehicle transfers and importation.  
4  Our analysis identified 16 individuals who were a director of at least 5 of the top taxpaying companies.  
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Table 3 Individual taxpayers’ customs payments vis-à-vis income tax payments 
2013/2014 
  FY 2013/14 FY 2012/13 FY 2011/12 
 Custom tax paid  Total number of 
taxpayers   
Paid income 
tax  
Total number of 
taxpayers 
Paid income 
tax  
Total number of 
taxpayers  
Paid 
income tax   
 >1 bn  4 2 3 1 3 2 
  500 m-1 bn  12 
12 
0 16 4 6 
 
2 
  100 m-500 m  374 64 445 31 43 
 
14 
 
 50 m-100 m  809 88 734 28 57 
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 <50 m  25,743 
 
7,057 17,473 3,016 2,782 
 
576 
  Grand total  26,942 
 
7,211 18,671 
 
3,080 2,891 
 
613 
 
 
 
c. With the exception of employment income, government officials rarely pay taxes on their 
other income-generating activities. Too frequently, even the companies that they own 
are not compliant with their income tax obligations. Our analysis of the URA’s e-tax 
system identified government officials owning assets worth billions of shillings including 
schools, hotels and media houses. We studied seventy-one top-ranking government 
officials. Only one of the seventy-one officials has ever remitted individual income tax, 
and only a few of the 56 companies with which these individuals are associated remitted 
corporation tax in the years under review. Table 2 above highlights the poor taxpaying 
culture of these government officials and the companies they are associated with for 
financial years between 2011 and 2014. 
 
d. URA officials who we interviewed acknowledged the fact that, while various 
professionals such as lawyers, doctors, architects and engineers are likely to be HNWIs, 
the URA has been lax in auditing their compliance. Of the eleven individuals identified 
by CEO Magazine as being some of Uganda’s billionaires under forty years of age, two 
were lawyers and one a doctor (Nyambura 2015). Part VIII of the ITA provides for the 
taxation of partnerships and partners. The law requires that partnerships should file 
partnership returns, but that the tax should be charged on individual partners. Using the 
International Financial Law Review website, we identified some of Uganda’s top 
commercial law firms and their partners. We sampled sixty lawyers for tax compliance. 
Table 4 shows the results. 
 
Table 4 Compliance of top lawyers for individual income tax 
 FY 2011/12 FY 2012/13 FY 2013/14 
Total number of lawyers  60 60 60 
Paid individual taxes 12 14 17 
 
The above statistics relating to the taxation of individuals underscore one important aspect: 
there is potential to increase revenue collection by improving enforcement measures on 
personal income taxes. One of the tax consultants interviewed reported that some of the 
individuals they advise voluntarily report on their contracts by filing returns with the URA. 
However, to the best of their knowledge, the latter has never audited the activities of these 
individuals (Interview with tax consultants). If the URA is to successfully tax HNWIs, it needs 
to buttress its operations as far as taxing individuals is concerned.  
 
The statistics also reveal another aspect that will be discussed when analysing the issue of 
information sharing: there is still room to improve the efficiency of the e-tax system to ensure 
that the platforms of different URA departments automatically interface to optimise revenue 
collection.  
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3.3.2 Taxation of allowances  
 
Section 19 of the ITA provides that employment income includes ‘the amount of any 
travelling, entertainment, utilities, cost of living, housing, medical or other allowance’. 
Employment income also includes the value of any benefit granted to an employee. In 
practice, particularly in the public sector, these allowances are not included in the taxable 
income of employees (Interview with URA Official). In September 2006, for example, 
parliamentary proceedings revealed that subsistence allowances given to MPs and lecturers 
at Makerere University were not subjected to tax (Parliament of Uganda 2006). These 
allowances, commonly known as per diems, vary depending on the government agency, and 
can be quite substantial. They often cover items such as allowances for attending 
workshops, travelling locally and internationally for training and research, accommodation, 
meals, and, more fundamentally, payments under projects where those involved get paid 
separately from their employment income. Government seminars and workshops often 
involve significant amounts (Parliament of Uganda 2011b):  
 
 Shs.8.6 billion (approximately US$3.09 million) in 2010 and a budget of Shs.7.8 billion 
(approximately US$2.8 million) for 2011 in the Prime Minister’s Office; 
 Ministry of Public Service: Shs.720 million (approximately US$0.26 million) in 2010 and a 
budget of Shs.2.12 billion (approximately US$0.76 million) for 2011; 
 Ministry of Local Government: Shs.6.56 billion (approximately US$2.35 million) in 2010 
and a budget of Shs.8.83 billion (approximately US$3.17 million) in 2011; 
 Ministry of Finance: Shs.6.3 billion (approximately US$2.26 million) in 2010 and a 
budgeted Shs.11.02 billion (approximately US$3.95 million) for 2011; and 
 Ministry of Water and Environment: Shs.4.75 billion (approximately US$1.7 million) in 
2010 and a budget of Shs.7.12 billion (approximately US$2.55 million) for 2011.  
 
Payments under independent projects within government agencies and universities often 
involve even bigger amounts, yet the income earned from them often goes untaxed. This 
translates into two things. First, there is loss of tax revenue. Second, there is an unfair 
application of tax laws, particularly given the fact that some employers in the private sector 
subject these allowances to tax.  
 
3.3.3 Optimisation of Tax Identification Numbers (TINs) 
 
The law requires each taxpayer to have a unique identifier called a Tax Identification 
Number (TIN), which is to be included in all their tax returns and correspondence with the 
URA. In practice, there are instances when the URA relaxes the requirement to use TINs. 
One example relates to the use of the e-tax system, where business entities are required to 
provide TINs for all their employees before they can use the system. The URA relaxed this 
rule when it was established that some employees did not have TINs (Interview with Tax 
Consultants). While one can appreciate the URA’s predicament, this relaxing of rules 
translates into a difficulty in identifying individuals who have more than one employer. It also 
means that these individuals can avoid their obligation to file personal returns and dodge 
taxes. 
 
3.3.4 Other disconnects between theory and practice 
 
Other examples of the disconnect between the law and administration of the same include: 
 
(a) Rarely implementing the provision of the ITA which requires that persons transferring 
funds in excess of 2500 currency points to a place outside Uganda should obtain a tax 
clearance certificate from the URA (Interview with Tax Consultants); 
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(b) Rarely implementing the provisions relating to the taxation of trusts (Interview with Tax 
Lawyer). In practice, this has been made difficult by the fact that frequently the wealth 
inherited is not properly documented – it is part of the informal sector.  
 
The above shortcomings in tax administration directly impact the URA’s ability to increase 
tax revenue, and, unless addressed, will negatively impact its ability to tax HNWIs 
effectively. 
  
 
4  Management and exchange of information 
 
Effective tax administration depends on collaboration between revenue authorities and a 
network of actors including other government agencies, banks, employers, utility companies, 
professional bodies and revenue authorities in other countries (Moore 2013). More 
specifically, the ability to identify and tax HNWIs relies heavily on the ability of revenue 
authorities to access information from various sources. Section 131 of the ITA gives the URA 
the right to access taxpayer information, including the right to seize, retain, and make copies 
of the information. To ensure that the privacy of information is safeguarded, all URA officials 
gaining access to taxpayer information are required to keep it confidential (Section 157). 
Information access has been enabled through various avenues. 
 
4.1  Channels for sharing information  
 
There are various mechanisms in place to enable the URA to access taxpayer information. 
We discuss these below. 
 
4.1.1 Sharing of information within the URA 
 
There are three main electronic systems used by the URA to manage information: the e-tax 
system, ASYCUDA World, and SunSystems. These three systems deal with different 
aspects of information management. E-tax is used for domestic taxes. ASYCUDA World is 
for customs data (international taxes), and SunSystems collects information on expenditure 
and payment of suppliers, taxpayers and staff members. All three systems have a built-in 
mechanism that red-flags inconsistencies and allows for the sharing of information between 
the different departments of the URA. For example, domestic tax officials are able to match 
the declarations made on importation of goods with those made for purposes of domestic 
taxes (such as input VAT), to ensure that the information is coherent. 
 
Additionally, in 2014, the URA established a Joint Compliance Committee (JCC) with the 
objectives of: improving collaboration between URA departments, reducing the interruption 
of taxpayer activities through conducting joint audits for domestic taxes, customs and tax 
investigation, and promoting efficient utilisation of scarce resources by conducting joint 
sector training and taxpayer education activities. The JCC analyses internal and external 
data to develop risk indicators by sector. During FY 2014/15, the JCC audited ten cases, 
which resulted in assessments totalling Shs.55.77 billion (approximately US$20.01 million). 
For FY 2015/16, the JCC conducted rigorous tax compliance analyses, which were 
subsequently used to develop focus areas for the URA to concentrate on during the financial 
year.  
 
4.1.2 Memoranda of Understanding  
 
The URA has concluded memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with agencies inside and 
outside Uganda to facilitate the exchange of information. Within Uganda, it has entered into 
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MOUs with institutions such as KCCA, URSB, Bank of Uganda, Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 
the FIA, Ministry of Trade, National Drug Authority, Uganda Manufacturers’ Association, 
Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority, Uganda Communications 
Commission, National Social Security Fund and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
Outside Uganda, the URA has MOUs with other East African Community (EAC) revenue 
agencies (Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Tanzania), South Sudan, South Africa, United 
States of America, and development partners including the Department for International 
Development, KfW and Trade Mark East Africa.  
 
These MOUs facilitate the sharing of taxpayer information and learning through best 
practice. By entering into an MOU with KCCA, for example, the URA is able to access the 
latter’s property register and obtain information on businesses that have been issued with 
trading licences that might not be on the URA register. Similarly, the FIA has, since the 
beginning of its operations in late 2014, shared eight cases of suspicious transactions with 
the URA’s Tax Investigations Department (Interview with FIA official). Most of these cases 
involve foreign individuals who use their personal bank accounts to undertake company 
transactions. Because the URA has not placed enough emphasis on taxing individuals, 
these foreign individuals bank money in their personal accounts and later repatriate it to their 
home countries. In this way, most of the money goes untaxed. Cooperation between FIA and 
the URA is also important because of the extensive network of MOUs that the FIA has with 
other countries in the region.5 It remains to be seen whether the URA will utilise this avenue 
to improve compliance. Lastly, while the MOU that the URA has with the other four East 
African countries is not for exchange of taxpayer information, it provides a platform for tax 
administrators to exchange ideas on how to deal with various challenges and to share 
research on issues that they have investigated, thereby promoting best practice (Interview 
with URA official).  
 
4.1.3 Exchange of information through Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) 
 
Uganda does not have any Exchange of Information agreements on tax issues. However, it 
has DTAs that contain provisions on exchange of information. At the time of writing, Uganda 
had ratified DTAs with nine countries: Zambia (1968), United Kingdom (1993), Norway 
(2001), South Africa (2001), Denmark (2001), India (2004), Mauritius (2004), Italy (2005) and 
the Netherlands (2006). There are also a number of treaties which are at different stages of 
negotiation, including those with the EAC, Egypt, China, Belgium, United Arab Emirates and 
Seychelles.  
 
Information normally exchanged under these agreements includes company shareholding, 
dividend payments, management fees, tax returns, payments of royalties, interest and 
capital gains (Interview with URA official). Prior to 2014, the competent authority under most 
of these DTAs was the Ministry of Finance. Revenue officials often raised the concern that 
this resulted in too much bureaucracy and delays in the process of responding to information 
requests. Since March 2014, the Tax Investigations Department in the URA is the 
Competent Authority. It has made eight requests for information since then, and received 
four requests, all of which have been responded to.  
 
In addition, Uganda is a member of the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information in Tax Matters and the African Tax Administration Forum, both of 
which advocate exchange of information between member states. In November 2015, 
Uganda signed the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters, which will enable the URA to have access to information on its residents that have 
                                                          
5  Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Seychelles and Ethiopia. 
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commercial dealings in any of the eighty-nine other countries that are participating in the 
convention (OECD 2015).  
 
4.1.4 Other sources of information  
 
There are various other channels of information to the URA including informers, moles, 
stamp duty paid on land transactions, non-governmental organisations, the police, and 
economic desks of other government agencies such as the Internal Security Organisation 
and the External Security Organisation. The URA has a toll-free number, a budget and a unit 
in charge of handing informers. An estimate of Shs.28.4 billion (approximately US$10.19 
million) is collected annually through information provided by informers (correspondence with 
URA official).  
 
4.2 Obstacles to sharing information within the URA 
 
The above mechanisms provide important inroads to taxpayer information. However, 
exchange of information is still undermined by several factors.  
 
4.2.1 Competing interests in URA departments 
 
One of the biggest challenges that was identified as undermining information sharing within 
the URA is the silo mentality between departments (Interviews with URA officials). Even with 
the existence of the JCC, departments often have independent plans and targets, which 
dictate their priorities. Sometimes there are competing priorities. For example, those in the 
core operation departments may be more interested in meeting their revenue targets than in 
helping with the compiling of evidence that may result in the prosecution of an individual 
taxpayer. This leads to concentrating on collecting whatever little they can from that 
taxpayer, instead of working with another department to build a stronger case that could 
subsequently be used to deter other taxpayers from evasion. 
 
4.2.2 Weaknesses in automated processes  
 
In addition, while the URA has made significant progress in automating its services, there 
are certain limitations on the use of these systems. To begin with, even though these 
systems contain a wealth of information, they do not automatically flag inconsistencies in the 
different databases. Detecting these inconsistencies is a manual exercise, which largely 
depends on the diligence and impulse of the revenue officials dealing with the cases. Also, in 
a move to safeguard the sanctity of what is often sensitive information, only authorised 
personnel have unlimited access to systems such as e-tax. For example, out of the forty staff 
members in the Research, Planning and Development Department, only seven officials have 
access to the e-tax system (Interviews with URA officials). This access is further restricted to 
dynamic reports, which do not provide the comprehensive picture necessary for the 
analytical work required by a research department.  
 
4.2.3 Limitations to accessing information from third parties 
 
One important source of taxpayer information is commercial banks. During interviews, 
various URA officials cited difficulties in accessing information from banks. They highlighted 
various obstacles to access: (i) the URA is only able to access this information if it is in 
possession of an agency notice; (ii) the Central Bank sometimes interferes with the process 
of accessing information by protecting commercial banks; (iii) banks sometimes collude with 
their customers to hide information from the URA; (iv) banks sometimes refuse to provide 
the URA with information such as that relating to lists of clients’ bank accounts; and (v) slow 
response to the URA’s requests. On the whole, it appears that the difficulties faced by the 
URA in accessing information from banks result from two factors. First, some officials are 
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unaware of the fact that Section 131 of the ITA gives the URA unqualified access to 
information that is in the possession of taxpayers, which covers bank accounts. Second, 
access is often unsuccessful because of the manner in which URA officials make their 
requests. In our interviews with officials from the Bank of Uganda and the commercial bank, 
for example, it was noted that where the URA has failed to access information, it has been 
because: (i) those requesting the information do not appear to know exactly what information 
they are looking for at the time of making the request; (ii) they do not ask the right questions; 
or (iii) they are not specific enough in the requests that they make.  
 
There are a number of challenges as far as sharing information with other government 
agencies is concerned. To begin with, many of these agencies are at different levels of 
automation or use different technology. One of the major challenges to sharing registration 
information between KCCA and the URA under the TREP project, for example, is that e-tax 
and KCCA’s ECITIE are not interfaced, which results in delays in the sharing of information 
and analysis of data (TREP Report 2015). Other government agencies, such as the land 
registry, pose even bigger challenges because of the low levels of automation. Second, 
some of the information found in these agencies is outdated, inaccurate or misplaced. Third, 
the URA does not have a good working relationship with some government agencies such 
as the Ministry of Lands. There have been reports, for example, of the URA being required 
to pay fees in order to conduct searches on land titles which are in possession of the land 
registry (Interview with Revenue official). 
 
Lastly, while MOUs are an important source of information, their effectiveness is limited 
largely by the fact that there is no central place for managing them. The URA’s legal 
department drafts and/or peruses through these agreements to ensure that the URA’s 
interests are protected. However, different departments or divisions within departments 
initiate the agreements. Those who initiate them have the responsibility of managing, 
implementing and monitoring the agreements. The challenge of lacking a central place of 
management is that, sometimes, officials in other departments are not aware of the 
existence of an MOU, and so will not utilise it. Even if they were to become aware of the 
existence of an MOU, the fact that it was not signed with them may pose some challenges in 
attempting to obtain information from the third party.  
 
4.2.4 Accuracy and comprehensiveness of data 
 
Sometimes the information possessed by the URA is inaccurate and/or incomplete 
(Interviews with URA officials). For example, an analysis of the taxpayer register for 
purposes of this research revealed that over 16 per cent of company directors declared 
wrong TINs when registering companies. Some of them used old TINs that have been 
phased out, while others inserted TINs in the wrong format.6 Revenue officials also reported 
that often taxpayers provide inaccurate and/or incomplete information regarding their 
contacts and location. Lastly, there are also inconsistencies between information contained 
in the assets register and the stamp duty register (Interview with URA official). These 
inconsistencies undermine the potential of data matching exercises. 
 
The above shortcomings are exacerbated by two other factors. First, TINs are often issued 
without undertaking a detailed verification of the person seeking to be registered. The result 
is that the same individual can have more than one TIN by changing some aspect of their 
identity. Second, the URA has no team that is dedicated to examining the strengths and 
weaknesses of the registration process. If such a team were in place, it would have flagged 
out cases of duplicate TINs, and identified cases of low productivity or inaction of registered 
persons (Interview with URA official).  
 
                                                          
6  There is, however, an on-going exercise to clean up these records through the e-tax system. 
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4.2.5 Capacity of URA officials to utilise data 
 
Many of those interviewed within the URA observed that, while there is wealth of information, 
there is limited capacity to analyse the data. For example, the Business Intelligence Unit of 
the Research and Planning Department only has two staff members. Other officials in the 
research department are over-stretched because of multiple projects with few revenue 
officials. This is a challenge for most other departments. As such, there are a number of 
checks which are not undertaken. For example, not enough analysis is going into the 
scrutiny of land transactions, to match stamp duty payments with tax compliance (Interview 
with URA officials).  
 
 
5  Taxing HNWIs in Uganda: a preliminary 
approach 
 
The URA’s approach to taxing HNWIs ought to take a two-pronged approach. The first set of 
remedies should be targeted at the taxpayers, and involve various considerations. First, the 
URA needs to be awake to the political and instrumental power enjoyed by these individuals. 
Second, it should have strategies in place to address the high levels of non-compliance. 
Some cases of non-compliance are deliberate. Others are a result of taxpayers’ ignorance of 
their obligations. Each of these should be treated differently. Third, mechanisms should be 
developed to deal with the prevalence of the informal sector. The second set of remedies 
should be geared towards the URA in particular and government in general. First, both the 
URA and the government need to critically examine the reasons behind the high levels of 
non-compliance. Second, the government needs to take bold steps to address the problem 
of the informal sector. Third, the URA should continue building the capacity of its staff. We 
briefly discuss these proposals, and emphasise that our recommendations here serve simply 
as a preamble to our next task. We shall explore the recommendations in more detail in the 
second phase of this project, which will provide more concrete guidance.  
 
5.1 Approaches targeted at taxpayers 
 
5.1.1 Encouraging quasi-voluntary compliance 
 
Tax experts agree that it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve complete voluntary 
compliance (Moore 2013; Everest-Phillips 2009; Therkildsen 2001). They argue that quasi-
voluntary kind of compliance is more attainable: compliance that is defined by limited 
resistance from taxpayers because they appreciate the role of taxes. This involves tax 
bargains (Kangave and Katusiimeh 2015; Therkildsen 2001). As already noted, one of the 
challenges with taxing this group of individuals is that they are either politicians or politically 
connected. For this reason, most interviewees agreed that perhaps the most effective 
approach would be to identify the individuals, explain to them what is meant by HNWIs, and 
then engage in dialogue with them about the importance of taxes and their contribution to 
the same. This approach takes cognisance of the fact that coercion is costly and should only 
be applied in cases where quasi-voluntary compliance fails. It also acknowledges that elites 
are not necessarily anti-development; they may be driven by self-interest, but they are 
central to reform processes (DiCaprio 2014). 
  
Because of the nature of the individuals involved, there is need for political buy-in at the top-
most level of government and URA management. In the end, as long as these individuals 
remain compliant, their relationship with the URA and government should be one of 
partnership, working together to ensure that compliance is improved on the one hand, and 
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government is made accountable for taxes on the other hand. In Colombia, the government 
was successful in imposing a security tax on elites primarily because of three reasons: (a) 
fiscal and economic conditions in the country, which dictated that the government declare a 
state of emergency requiring the adoption of a tax decree; (b) solidarity and cohesion 
between government and business elites; and (c) improved perceptions that the government 
was in position to account for the taxes through the provision of security (Flores-Macías 
2012).  
 
This approach of negotiating with taxpayers is an example of the cooperative compliance 
advocated by the OECD (OECD 2009). It ensures that, at least for those that prove to be 
compliant, the costs of using coercion are reduced. Given the fact that the URA is 
constrained by financial and human resources, this method would release resources to be 
targeted at those who are less compliant. 
  
5.1.2 Dealing with non-compliance: tax education and tax amnesties 
 
Not all non-compliance is deliberate. Some taxpayers are ignorant of their taxpaying 
obligations. Those working on the Rental Project found that many individuals do not know 
that taxes should be paid on residential rental properties (Interview with URA officials). 
Similarly it has been noted that, frequently, taxpayers believe that once their PAYE is 
withheld or they have paid customs duties, their tax obligations are fulfilled – even though 
they generate income from other commercial activities (Interviews with URA officials). Even 
highly-educated individuals do not always appreciate the interpretations of tax legislation. 
For example, because Article 128 (7) of the Constitution prohibits the salaries, allowances 
and benefits of judicial officers from being varied to their disadvantage, some judicial officers 
have interpreted this to mean that all their income (even that outside their employment) is 
exempt from tax (Interview with URA official).  
 
The URA conducts various tax clinics to sensitise taxpayers on their rights and obligations. 
However, more needs to be done. There is a need for a tax education strategy that 
challenges the taxpaying culture (Interview with URA official). The URA should develop a 
strategy that is specifically geared towards the needs of HNWIs, because empirical evidence 
shows that they rarely, if at all, attend the general tax clinics currently run by the URA 
(Interview with URA official).  
 
The tax strategy should, among other things, provide a better understanding of the 
operations of the URA, in order to clean up the negative image that taxpayers have of the 
organisation. Some taxpayers complain, for example, that the URA often takes an 
aggressive and unfair approach to the interpretation of tax laws (Interview with tax 
consultants). Others fear the URA because they believe that any contact with it will result in 
taking away their property (Interview with URA official). Often, after URA officials explain 
how taxation works, many of these individuals wish that they had engaged with it earlier 
instead of using ‘quack’ advisors who sometimes end up costing them more because of the 
resulting tax exposure.  
 
The government should consider giving a tax amnesty to encourage more HNWIs to 
disclose their incomes. In 2007, the government provided an amnesty by waiving interest 
and penalties on taxes for those who voluntarily disclosed their tax liability (Parliament of 
Uganda 2008). As a result of the amnesty, the URA collected Shs.41 billion (approximately 
US$14.71 million), and brought new taxpayers onto the register. While this amnesty was 
undeniably useful in increasing revenue collection, some wonder whether it would not have 
achieved more if it had been structured differently (Interview with tax practitioner). It is not 
clear how many new taxpayers were brought onto the register, but, if the taxes collected are 
any indication, it is quite likely that most of these taxes were collected from taxpayers who 
were already on the register but who had not been fully compliant. To target the large 
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informal sector, tax amnesties should be structured so that they encourage previously fully 
non-compliant parties to voluntarily identify themselves. This would entail not only waiving 
interest and penalties, but also waiving the principal taxes, because these can be quite 
substantial and would discourage people from coming clean (Interview with tax practitioner).  
 
Experts have warned against treating amnesties as the panacea to non-compliance 
(Fjeldstad et al. 2014). They argue that, for amnesties to be successful, they need to go 
beyond providing relief for past non-compliance. Amnesties should influence behavioural 
changes by increasing the likelihood that future non-compliance will be punished. For this 
reason, they ought to be perceived by taxpayers as ‘onetime opportunities to redress tax 
violations’ (Uchitelle 1989). They should also be followed with strict enforcement measures.  
 
The URA should advertise the introduction of the new segment of HNWIs as a one-time 
opportunity for these individuals to benefit from disclosing their income without fear of being 
penalised. To ensure that the amnesty is successful, several measures should be taken: 
 
 Announce the amnesty at the same time as announcing the URA’s decision to embark 
on the project for taxing HNWIs; 
 Set out a comprehensive strategy for educating HNWIs on their tax obligations, their 
rights as taxpayers, and provide accountability for the taxes collected. The education 
strategy should consist of top-level management visits to individual taxpayers, and 
allocating URA officials to these individuals with the aim of helping them to clean up their 
books; 
 To ensure that unidentified individuals are reached, communication about the amnesty 
should not be limited to budget speeches and parliamentary debates that individuals 
rarely listen to. It should be communicated on local television and radio stations, and 
through national and local government agencies such as the KCCA, Ministry of Lands 
and Ministry of Finance; 
 Remind taxpayers that the amnesty is a one-time opportunity, and that any non-
compliance will be punished. This should be followed up with an increase in audits on 
individuals and the enforcement of the law against those who do not comply.  
 
5.1.3 Dealing with deliberate non-compliance 
 
The recommendations made above will result in increased compliance. However, for those 
that have thrived from being informal, or those acquiring income from unexplained sources, 
more creative methods need to be employed.  
 
One method that should be applied more is to rely on consumption patterns to estimate 
income (Ministry of Finance). This would entail tracing the consumption patterns of 
individuals, including the land transactions that they undertake, cars that they drive, the kind 
of houses that they own, frequency of international flights (particularly in business or first 
class), and individuals making frequent transfers of large sums of money. These 
transactions should then be used to make presumptive tax assessments, which would have 
the effect of shifting the tax burden to the taxpayer. At least one URA official has warned that 
lifestyle choices in Uganda are not indicative of income levels, because most of those living 
flashy lifestyles simply do so to show off, without necessarily being wealthy. However, given 
the large informal sector, consumption patterns are important in raising assessments, at the 
very least for the purpose of shifting the tax burden. The URA has made three attempts in 
this regard, which, while achieving limited success, have the potential to help with the 
identification of HNWIs if properly executed.  
 
In 2011, the URA introduced a system requiring that persons buying land valued at more 
than Shs.50,000,000 (approximately US$17,941) should obtain income tax clearance 
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indicating the purchaser’s source of income, before the land could be registered in their 
name. Given the importance of land as a symbol of wealth, this initiative was a move in the 
right direction. However, it was soon politicised and subsequently stopped before the URA 
could generate any meaningful information. The URA should consider reintroducing this with 
the support of top government officials. 
 
More recently, the URA made another attempt to tax consumption patterns (Interview with 
URA official). It developed a list of high value cars, which was used as a basis for raising 
presumptive taxes on the vehicle owners. Most of the cars in question also had personalised 
number plates (which are more expensive than ordinary number plates). The URA’s 
enforcement division then issued warrants to the owners of the cars and, in some cases, 
attached the cars. Some taxes were collected through this drive. However, the process 
faced various challenges. First, in a number of cases, enforcement measures were 
undertaken before making attempts to engage the taxpayers in a more cordial manner – an 
approach that would have resulted in establishing better facts about the potential taxpayer. 
Second, some of the assessments raised by URA officials were not grounded in proper 
investigations to establish reasonable values for the cars, resulting in over-estimations. In 
the end, the exercise achieved only limited success. However, the important lesson is that is 
raised some taxes and resulted in adding a few taxpayers onto the register.       
 
The third approach involves a bold move by the URA to tax illicit  wealth (specifically from 
corruption-related scandals). Using information obtained from the Criminal Investigations 
Department in the Uganda Police, the land registry, KCCA and field operations, the URA is 
investigating seven companies and three individuals implicated in corruption scandals 
(correspondence with URA official). Taxes worth approximately Shs.5 billion (approximately 
US$1.79 million) have been assessed, and the URA’s Debt Collection Unit is trying to 
recover them. This approach is not without challenges. To impose a tax on public funds that 
the government is trying to recover poses a predicament (Interview with tax lawyer). Can the 
money be referred to as taxable income of the individual when the government is also 
claiming the same money? What happens if the courts determine that the individual is guilty, 
and, as such, should refund the money? This approach is not ideal. But it is important for 
various reasons. First, it recognises the vast amounts of wealth associated with illicit income. 
Second, it seeks to tax income that may be difficult to trace after it has been invested or 
taken offshore. Third, it seeks to return to public coffers part of what has been illegally 
removed.  Where persons are found accountable yet have already paid tax on this income, 
the ITA has provisions to refund overpaid taxes. Fourth, this approach may serve to deter 
public officials from engaging in corruption.   
 
What is important about the above three approaches is not that they have shortcomings. 
They are important because they use non-conventional approaches to deal with issues that 
do not lend themselves well to simple solutions. If properly thought through, these 
approaches have the potential to bring more taxpayers onto the register, and reduce the 
number of those operating informally.   
 
5.2 Approaches targeting the URA and government 
 
5.2.1 Building tax morale 
 
Everest-Phillips argues that elites are more likely to pay taxes when they share the 
conviction that taxation is necessary for their benefit and that of the country’s long-term 
future (Everest-Phillips 2009). Similarly, Therkildsen notes that ‘Quasi-voluntary compliance 
will occur when taxpayers have confidence that rulers keep their part of the contract, and 
other constituents keep theirs’ (Therkildsen 2001). Effective taxation relies significantly on 
the legitimacy of the state as expressed in its ability to account for the taxes that it collects. 
To this end, it is important for the government of Uganda to reflect on the country’s poor tax-
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paying culture. Many Ugandans are unwilling to pay taxes for a variety of reasons. First, they 
feel that the government does not provide the basic necessities that tax money should fund. 
While the government provides services such as universal primary and secondary 
education, and free healthcare in government hospitals, the poor quality of these services 
often means that even individuals who earn relatively low incomes have to resort to the 
private sector for services, resulting in a significant dent in their income. Second, tax morale 
is undermined by the frequent reports of corruption scandals, often involving the 
embezzlement of millions of taxpayer shillings by public servants. Third, the motivation to 
pay taxes is undermined by the fact that there are many freeriders who share in public 
benefits, but dodge their tax obligations.  
 
No attempt at achieving a sustainable tax regime can be one-sided. Designing strategies 
aimed at ensuring compliance, without addressing the concerns of potential taxpayers, is 
bound to produce only limited success. Sustainable taxation is hinged primarily on the 
legitimacy of the state. Government thus needs to take measures to reduce corruption, 
improve the quality of public services and promote fair taxation, by ensuring that it not only 
taxes all individuals above the tax threshold, but also that people are taxed relative to their 
wealth. 
 
5.2.2 Tackling the problem of the informal sector 
 
There is an intimate relationship between the existence of a large informal sector and a 
country’s ability to raise tax revenue (Moore 2013). While the URA acknowledges that there 
are shortcomings in tax administration, it also maintains that as long as the informal sector 
continues to constitute the bulk of the economy, and cash remains the dominant mode of 
transacting, it is unlikely that there will be any meaningful increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio 
(Interview with URA official). For this reason, the government needs to develop a strategy for 
shrinking the informal sector, minimising the use of cash.  
 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to formalising the economy is the lack of a functional 
identification process. Most of those interviewed highlighted the fact that it is difficult to 
establish audit trails because of the lack of a proper identification system. Even in institutions 
such as banks, where identification documents are required, it is difficult to verify the 
authenticity of documents used (Interview with officials in the banking sector). For example, 
many of the reference letters that are provided by local council officials to support the 
opening of bank accounts are easy to forge. There are also many reports of local council 
officials being bribed to provide references.  
 
The recent introduction of a national identification system has the potential to deal with some 
of the challenges posed by the informal sector. The National Security Information System 
project, operated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is aimed at identifying, registering and 
processing identity (ID) cards for eligible Ugandan citizens and foreign residents.7 The 
National ID cards include biological data, fingerprints and electronic facial features.8 For this 
ID to be effectively used to further tax collection, it ought to be used as the single identifier 
for a variety of official, business and some personal transactions including registering for 
taxes, opening bank accounts, registration of businesses, obtaining and renewing driving 
licences, land transfers and identification for immigration purposes. More importantly, the 
different institutions that collect this information need to develop systems which interface to 
ensure optimal use of the National ID for tax purposes. It is also important to ensure that 
there is a robust mechanism in place to keep the personal information of taxpayers safe and 
confidential.   
 
                                                          
7  National Information Technology Authority-Uganda, ‘National ID’ <http://www.nita.go.ug/projects/national-id>. 
8  National Security Information System, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ <http://nsis.go.ug/faqs>. 
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5.2.3 Strengthening capacity of URA officials 
 
Improving tax administration to support the taxation of HNWIs will also entail improving the 
technical capacity of URA officials, both to undertake effective audits based on the limited 
information that is available (Interview with Official from the Ministry of Finance), and to 
internalise and analyse available data effectively. The URA has a wealth of information in its 
possession, but there are no dedicated personnel to analyse this information for the purpose 
of improving performance. Similarly, systems need to be put in place to evaluate the 
performance of the various programmes being run by the URA, such as TREP and the e-tax 
system.  
 
6  Conclusion: the way forward 
 
Experience from other jurisdictions attests to the fact that where economic elites have strong 
political and/or investment power, it is difficult to have significant increments in direct taxes 
(Fairfield 2013). However, modest revenue gains, which are quite important for struggling 
economies, are achievable when this group of individuals is targeted. In Colombia, for 
example, security taxes levied on elites between 2002 and 2010 contributed 5 per cent to tax 
revenue and 1 per cent to GDP (Flores-Macías 2012). Similarly, Uganda is likely to realise at 
least a modest increase in its tax revenue by taxing HNWIs. However, this exercise should 
be approached cautiously. Targeting these individuals should not mean increasing tax rates: 
this may result in more tax evasion, as those who feel unfairly targeted may increase 
operations in the informal sector. The additional 10 per cent tax on individuals earning an 
income of more than Shs.120,000,000 (approximately US$43,057) per year results in an 
effective tax rate of 40 per cent on high income earners. If properly administered, a lot of tax 
revenue would be collected from this additional tax. In the end, an effective strategy for 
taxing HNWIs will need to recognise that an important component of increasing revenue 
collection is taxing better, not necessarily taxing more. To this end, improving tax 
administration in the various ways suggested in this paper is quite central to improving 
revenue collection.  
 
To identify and tax Uganda’s HNWIs effectively, it will also be necessary to develop a 
comprehensive framework governing their taxation. Aspects to be addressed by such a 
framework include having a strategy to deal with the political problem; determining a 
threshold that is specific to Uganda’s economic realities; establishing whether to have a 
separate unit dedicated to these individuals that is distinct from the LTO; examining the 
existing tax bands and tax rates; and designing alternative strategies to engage with these 
taxpayers, including the development of a tax education strategy. In the second phase of this 
project, we plan to benchmark the practices of taxing HNWIs in at least four other 
jurisdictions, before developing a comprehensive strategy for Uganda.  
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